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Chapter One 
Introduction
In recent years there has been increased interest in examining 
what appears to be a steady decline in the United States1 economic 
prowess. The U.S. position is often envyingly contrasted with that 
of seemingly more successful countries whose economies are on a 
more positive track. The most notable of which is Japan, quite 
arguably the world’s most amazing present-day economic power. Even 
more impressive than Japan’s current accomplishments has been its 
remarkably swift recovery from post-war devastation. The results 
of this recovery are clear, with each of the following having shown 
considerable growth? national income, growth of tertiary 
industries, and international trade surplus. Although the results 
are undisputed, the reasons behind Japan's success still leads to 
a great deal of disagreement amongst scholars. This paper will 
attempt to answer this question on Japan’s success in one of its 
leading industries, semiconductors.
In particular, it will examine how the Japanese semiconductor 
industries were able to gain a foothold in the previously 
unchallenged United States market. This entrance took place 
between the years 1976- 1980 in a battle over 16 kilobyte (16K) and 
64 kilobyte (64K) microchips. Japan's victory was significant for 
two reasons; first, it served as a signal to the rest of the world 
that Japan was now one of its major economic powers. Second, it 
was a painful reminder to a declining U.S. electronic industry.
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For each country success in producing semiconductors is crucial for 
the following reasons.
1) Semiconductors are an important structural technology 
upon which a number of other electronic products are 
based.
2) New industries, such as semiconductor equipment, are 
created, thus generating employment, income, etc...
3) Semiconductors provide an important basis from which new 
scientific technologies can be developed.
4) They increase national security by allowing a country 
to not have to rely on others for strategic military 
parts.
5) Generates income and employment.
The above issues are crucial areas that will periodically be 
alluded to throughout the course of this examination. The main 
purpose of this paper will be to examine the reasons behind the 
Japanese semiconductor success. Although it is impossible to 
determine the exact outcome rendered by any one action, it is 
possible to hypothesize on the effect of a repeatable trait. It is 
from these traits that an acceptable explanation of the 
semiconductor question can be answered. It is my belief that 
Japan's success was due to a combination of the following 
situations which occurred in both the U.S. and Japan.
In the U.S., Japan was able to sell its chips as a result of;
1) The U.S semiconductor companies inability to produce 
sufficient amounts of chips to meet the growing demand
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created by the U.S. electronic firms.
2) Deteriorating product quality on the part of U.S.
companies as a result of insufficient investment into 
production equipment and semiconductor technology 
research.
In Japan, the following were crucial to its growing 
industries ?
1) The diverse nature of Japanese semiconductor firms 
allowed them to better withstand the debilitating effects 
of recession and thereby keep a sufficient stream of 
investment constantly flowing into their firms.
2) The Japanese firms actually produced a much higher- 
quality product than did its U.S. counterparts.
3) The Japanese firms had access to loans at much better 
rates than their American competitors, this was important 
in their decisions to invest more in production equipment 
and new technologies.
In conjunction with this it will be important to look at the 
Japanese government and determine exactly what type of role it 
played and whether or not it was instrumental in affecting the 
outcome of the Japan's success. The importance of this will be to 
determine whether or not critics who claim Japan's government is 
the crucial player in high-tech industries are justified in their 
opinion.
3
4Chapter Two
History of the Semiconductor
Before beginning with the examination it is essential to 
discuss the products and innovations which formed the core of the 
U.S.-Japan battle. The word ’semiconductor* is an all-purpose term 
that describes a wide array of electronic devices. Common to each 
of them is that they are all created with metals which have the 
following three characteristics:
1) That they become better conductors with increases in 
temperature.
2) They display the photovoltaic (photoelectric) effect.
When a voltage is applied, electrons become excited and 
are able to cross electrical barriers within the 
material.
3) A change of conductivity will occur with electric input. 
(Braun & Macdonald, p.15)
The semiconductor device credited with revolutionizing tne 
state of electronics was the germanium transistor invented by the 
team of John Bardeen, Walter Brattain, and William Shockley at 
Bell Laboratories during 1947 (Webbink, p.4). The benefit of the 
transistor was, simply enough, that it could transfer or amplify 
resistance. To better understand this, an excerpt from John 
Brattain's first demonstration describes exactly what this 
instrument could do. He wrote, MThis circuit was actually spoken 
over, and by switching the device in and out, a distinct gain in 
speech level could be heard and seen on the scope presentation with
no noticeable change in quality... It was determined that the power 
gain was on the order of a factor of eighteen or greater.M 
(Warshofsky, p.23) The importance of the transistor was that it 
was able to effectively replace vacuum tubes while at the same time 
being both smaller and more reliable.
The next significant innovation came during 1954 when Texas 
Instruments* George Teal created the first silicon transistor 
(Braun & Macdonald, p.55). This was an improvement over the 
germanium transistor which companies found, **.. .difficult to 
produce (reliably) and even harder to make with identical 
characteristics? life expectancy was uncertain and the transistors 
seemed inclined to deteriorate rapidly under temperature and 
humidity conditions which were far from extreme.** (Ibid, p.54)
Four years later, again at Texas Instruments, the integrated 
circuit (IC) was invented by Jack Kilby (Webbink, p.6). The 
significance of this circuit was that it combined the transistor, 
resistor, capacitor, and distributed capacitor onto one individual 
piece of semiconductor material (Warshofsky, p.28). After only a 
few years of modifications, the IC had revolutionized the 
electronics industry by allowing instruments such as computers to 
be built smaller, more reliable, and more efficient than ever 
before (Ibid, p.29). It was this particular innovation which the 
industries of today are now competing. The importance of the IC is 
that,
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First, it made it technically and economically feasible for the 
semiconductor manufacturers to integrate their operations
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vertically so as to produce entire end products such as electronic 
calculators and watches; in a similar vein, end equipment producers 
were able to develop their own IC manufacturing capability. The 
two developments blurred the traditional distinction between 
component and equipment manufacturing. Second, the product 
differentiation of individual IC's encouraged the entrance of new 
producers into the industry who previously would have found it 
difficult to compete with the established component manufacturers 
in the discrete devices market. (U.S. Semiconductor Industry-U.S. 
Dept, of Commerce, ITA, p .11)
The final revolutionary semiconductor device that will be 
referred to in this paper is the microprocessor. Created by Intel 
in 1971, this device is the programmable brain found inside all 
computers (Borrus, p.35). According to M. Morris Mano, "Its 
purpose is to interpret instruction codes received from memory and 
perform arithmetic, logic, and control operations with data stored 
in internal registers, memory words, or Input/Output interface 
units." (Mano, p.333) The significance of this device was that it 
could allow items such as computers and calculators to be built 
within price and size ranges reasonable for sale to the general 
public.
Returning to ICs, there existed during this period two 
predominant methods of producing these chips. The first type of 
chip invented was of the bi-polar variety which consisted of layers 
of silicon each having distinctive electrical characteristics 
(Kimura, p.39). The second type, invented in 1962, was the metal- 
oxide silicon (MOS) integrated circuit in which only the surface is 
'active' (Ibid, p.39). The difference between the two in terms of 
performance was described by Bob Johnstone as, "Bipolar devices are 
faster and can handle higher voltages than MOS devices but they
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take up more 'silicon real estate' than HOS devices. Bipolar 
devices are also power-hungry and beyond a certain level of 
integration, tend to melt. MOS allows more components to be packed 
into an IC." (Johnstone, p.81) It was in this NOS field that 
Japanese firms concentrated their resources and were able to 
compete against the United States. Therefore, this paper will 
examine MOS devices and the memory chips created using this 
process.
The particular chip in which Japan was most successful 
producing was the dynamic random access memory microchip (DRAM or 
RAM) (Kimura, p.42) A description of this device says, "DRAM 
microchips require that stores of information be electronically 
refreshed periodically, and static random access memory ICs do not 
require refreshing. Static RAM ICs are more technologically 
complex than dynamic RAM ICs because static RAM ICs require more 
active elements to form a static cell than dynamic RAM ICs for a 
given level of integration." (Ibid, p.45) In order to better 
understand the storage capacity of these devices, Peter Lewis 
stated that, "Eight bits makes a byte, which is roughly the 
equivalent of one letter or numeric character. About a thousand 
bytes (1,024) make up a kilobyte, or K." (Warshofsky, p.39) The 
chips that will be examined in this paper, the 16K RAM and 64K RAM 
are those that can store roughly 16,000 and 65,000 bits of 
information respectively (Webbink, p.40).
Success in semiconductor production is determined by a firm's 
ability to produce a larger number of products while at the same
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time managing to keep defects low. If a company is successful at 
this, they will then be able to create a cheaper product because 
the cost to produce will naturally decrease as more is created. 
Great profit in the semiconductor industry usually is not the 
result of new breakthroughs since the rate of innovation within the 
industry is so great that competitors are usually able to achieve 
the same results within only a small amount of time. The company 
that does not invest in research will soon find itself either 
rapidly becoming antiquated or helplessly dependent on acquiring 
licensing from other companies who do develop new technologies. On 
the other hand, if a company ignores its production facilities it 
fails to fully capitalize on its invention because it is unable to 
produce, and then sell its product. It is within the happy medium 
between these two that the Japanese firms have been able to place 
themselves. Uenohara gives a brief yet accurate account of Japan's 
semiconductor industry when he says, "Although (it) has not made 
any significant breakthroughs in the form of basic discoveries and 
inventions, it has contributed to realizing the broader potential 
of the new semiconductor technologies." (Uenohara et al, p.15)
The production of the RAM chip itself is extremely difficult 
due to the fact that it is very susceptible to defects. Almost all 
of these are attributable to contamination from outside sources 
such as components from nearby chemicals, factory personnel, 
production processes, and equipment (Kern, p.1887). Contamination 
can occur in any amount greater than 'one atom of impurity per 
million atoms of silicon'(Webbink, p.42). Because of this,
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companies with a 'cleaner1 production system are able to better 
compete than a company who might have a technically more advanced 
product but is unable to produce it without high contamination 
rates.
What is striking about the previously discussed technologies 
is that they were all invented in the United States. This point 
should not be overlooked since it is a psychologically important 
variable for both the American semiconductor industry and the U.S. 
government. Not only is it a matter of pride to be able to claim 
semiconductor superiority, but it is also expected that the U.S. 
should remain superior in this field solely because it was they who 
created it. For many companies, this line of reasoning is used 
when attempting to acquire help from the government in blunting the 
efforts of foreign firms attempting to enter the U.S. market. Upon 
further investigation though, this argument is not entirely true 
since research has been taking place in Japan for nearly the same 
amount of time as that of its U.S. counterparts. This is important 
because it helps disprove the claim that the Japanese semiconductor 
industry is an entity that was rapidly created by the government. 
In actuality, the Japanese semiconductor industry was founded by 
private corporations who would only later (late sixties- seventies) 
receive salient government assistance. To prove this is it will 
first be necessary to examine the history of the Japanese 
semiconductor industry.
Surprisingly, almost all of the current major Japanese 
semiconductor companies entered the industry during in the 1950s
(Uenohara et al, p.14). During this period these companies were 
focused on trying to recreate the transistor developed by the Bell 
Laboratories team (Kimura, p.51). The first Japanese transistor 
was built by Makoto Kikuchi who created it not by using scientific 
documentation from the Bell Lab discovery but from an account in 
Newsweek magazine (Warshofsky, p.61). This type of scavengering 
was a good representative example of Japanese research at the time. 
Their research was basically comprised of learning about a 
discovery, managing to get a sample of it, then trying to 
understand its principles by dissecting and examining it. It was 
not until they received licensing from U.S. firms that the Japanese 
companies were able to begin producing U.S. technologies, one 
example of this was the germanium transistors which Japan began 
manufacturing in 1956. In only a relatively short amount of time 
Japan, in 1959, had become the largest transistor producer in the 
world, selling 86.5 million units (Kimura, p.51). The Sony 
Corporation (created in 1946) was licensed the rights to build 
Bell *s transistor for only $25,000, this deal, •*,,.ranks among the 
greatest bargains in history.*1 (Warshofsky, p.62) This particular 
occurrence was Important because it was an early indicator of the 
success Japan could have in producing electronic items. It shows 
that they had the capability to quickly catch up with other more 
technologically-advanced companies and somehow manage to surpass 
them. This type of success contributed to a growing feeling of 
security among this industry*s investors whose money would later 
prove invaluable. It was also a warning to U.S. firms that they
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would have to be extremely careful in licensing technology for the 
reason that they might very well be creating their biggest 
competitor,
Japan's transistor success also is important because it 
establishes a vital foundation from which a higher-level 
semiconductor industry was to be built upon. Ho industry dealing 
in this type of advanced product could be created during any short 
period of time. This industry needs the experience that can only 
be acquired after years of research in which each mistake and 
success has been painstakingly examined, reexamined, questioned, 
understood, and only then put into production. Since Japan was 
involved so early on it was able to acquire the knowledge necessary 
to build a successful semiconductor industry. This casts doubt 
onto the argument stating Japan's government 'created' an industry 
in a field which they saw potential promise.
Throughout most of the 60s, the Japanese firms were 
consistently behind their American counterparts in terms of 
technological achievements. This was mainly the result of the 
Japanese firms inability to successfully develop and then compete 
in the silicon transistor market (Uenohara et al, p.14). To these 
industries' credit, they also lacked the domestic demand for the 
kind of devices that the U.S. received from its military and 
computer sectors (Kimura, p.51). It would not be until the 
development of the Integrated Chip market in the late 1960s that 
Japan was able to pursue a field in which it could be a world 
technological leader. It is at this point in which some of the
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events that take place are extremely important in affecting the 
Japanese entry into the U.S. market in the late 1970s. The first 
will be grouped into an examination which will look at conditions 
within the U.S. semiconductor industry since 1970.
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Chapter Three
United States Semiconductor Industry 1970-1978
One of the events contributing to Japan*s eventual victory was 
the inability of the U.S. firms to satisfy the world's 
semiconductor demands. This was the result of a number of factors, 
most of which were directly attributable to the 1974-75 recession. 
This particular recession created a situation of,
Unprecedented inventory liquidation, high money rates, soaring 
inflation, all harmonized to induce a catatonic state in the 
industry that dropped employment levels to new lows, closed plants, 
stifled capital formation, and impacted vital research and 
development programs. (Industry leaders cautious, p.l)
The recession was the result of rising industrial costs due to the 
Oil Embargo and also to conditions created by the end of the 
Vietnam War. For the semiconductor industry this resulted in a 
sharp decline in production and demand during the 1975 economic 
year. Within the United States semiconductor/electronic component 
production decreased from (using 1967-100) 145.1 in 1974 to 112*1 
in 1975 (Webbink, p.5). U.S. semiconductor exports dropped from 
the 1974 level of 1,247,498 thousands of dollars to 1,053,495 in 
1975, while imports of semiconductors declined from 961,338 in 1974 
to 802,687 during 1975 (U.S. Semiconductor Industry, U.S. Dept of 
Commerce-ITC, p.68)•
A decrease was also apparent in the quantity of shipments of 
integrated circuits, from 2,122 million dollars of product in 1974
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to 1,712 million in 1975 (Ibid, p.39). In effect, a decrease of 
roughly nineteen percent. As a whole, the average selling price of 
integrated circuits dropped roughly 30% in the course of only one 
year (Ibid, p.51). Other bad news for the U.S. firms came in a 
drop in their net earnings after taxes as a percent of sales.
Table 1. Net Earnings after Taxes as a Percent of Sales______ ___
Semiconductor All Manufacturing
Year Manufacturing Industries
1972 5.0% 4.3%
1973 7.4% 4.7%
1974 6.1% 5.5%
1975 3.9% 4.6%
Source: United States Industry. Department of Commerce, p.57
Looking at the chart it is apparent that semiconductors, 
although they usually had good years, tended to feel the effects of 
recessionary years much greater than did other industries. This 
particular recession was on a much greater scale than any other the 
semiconductor industry had yet to face. John R. Opel, president of 
IBM, felt that the 1974-75 recession affected his industry 
differently then the one in 1970-71 because its presence was 
worldwide rather than simply a U.S. phenomenon (Industry leaders 
cautious, p.l). This observation can be deemed correct when the 
figures on the Japanese market are also examined. The total
production of Integrated Circuits in Japan decreased a total of 6.2 
percent, 125.5 Yen billion in 1974 to 117.6 Yen billion in 1975 
(Semiconductor Industry, OECD, p.114). From these figures a
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Japanese slowdown is apparent, but not nearly as damaging as that 
which the United States firms suffered. Their ability to weather 
this economic storm is one of the most important reasons for the 
latter success the Japanese semiconductor industry would enjoy. 
Before examining this, it is important to explain why this 
difference occurred. In order to do this, some of the unfortunate 
influences that affected the U.S. market will be looked at.
In addition to the slowdown in the worldwide semiconductor 
industry, many of the U.S. firms were saddled with expenses which 
prior to the recession had seemed secure investments. The most 
important of them was labor. Labor costs rose during a year in 
which the industry found its net earnings decline sharply.
Table 2. U.S. Domestic Semiconductor Industry Manufacturing Costs 
— _________________________ LL.Ql--tgM.lJ______________________________
1972 1973 1974 1975
Value of output 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Payroll 33.5 31.6 32.1 38.3
Cost of Materials, 32.7 35.8 38.5 34.9
Fuels, etc. 
Capital Expenditures 6.0 8.6 10.5 9.0
Other 27.8 23.8 18.9 17.8
Source: TheSemiconductor Industry, Douglas Webbink, p.14
in fact, during this recession year (in which semiconductor output 
decreased by nearly 22 percent) semiconductor employment only 
dropped about five percent (Ibid, p.96). The effect of this was 
that it helped drain valuable capital from the semiconductor firms
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who truly needed it for research purposes, materials, and capital 
expenditures.
One additional labor problem the semiconductor industry began 
to experience during the early 1970s concerned the tendency of 
individuals to leave their firm for the purpose of starting their 
own company. The problem this created was discussed by Fred 
Warshofsky?
It saps the original company of some of its best talent, and the 
small start-up companies they create are too small and financially 
weak to compete in the industry now that large economies of scale 
and huge capital investments are required. and so the 
entrepreneurial spirit that is the great strength of Silicon Valley 
is suddenly conceived by many experts to be its Achilles heel. 
(Warshofsky, p.44)
This situation is best reflected in the fact that between 
1969-75 a total of twenty-five new semiconductor companies were 
formed (Borrus, pp.30-31). The founders of these companies were 
made of former employees from the following firms; Fairchild, 
National Semiconductor, IBM, Nortec, Texas Instruments, Signetics, 
Hewlett-Packard, General Instruments, Mellon4ns, Monsanto, American 
Microsystems (Ibid, p.30-31). For all practical purpose these 
major companies basically were the United States semiconductor 
industry, and the defection of their most talented members did 
nothing to help them grow.
Demand and labor questions were not the only areas in which 
difficulties arouse, perhaps the most devastating was the loss of 
confidence the semiconductor industry had among its investors. Due
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to observations made on the 'natural1 reaction of the semiconductor 
industry to fluxuations in the economy, the industry managed to 
acquire the reputation of being 'very sensitive to recessions' 
(Webbink, p.39). In other words, a risky investment* As far as the 
stockholder's own interests were concerned, the dividends they 
could expect to receive greatly fluctuated.
Table 3. Net Income After Taxes as a Percent of Stockholder's 
Equity for Selected Semiconductor Companies and for All 
________________HarotfAgtorlna- m , o-i?75____________________
Year All Semiconductor Cos. All Manufacturing Cos.
1973 21.87 12.84
1974 17.97 14.83
1975 8.02 11.42
Source: Douglas Webbink, The Semiconductor Industry, p.178
It must be pointed out that the only reason the semiconductor 
industries showed a positive number in 1975 was due to the great 
success of the four leading companies. When looking at those 
firms which recorded total sales between $25 million to $100 
million, their total net income as a percent of stockholder's 
equity was a negative number, -9.96 percent.
In addition to this, a number of people believed there did not 
exist a spectacular future in the items semiconductors form an 
integral part of. For instance, in the August 1978 issues of 
Radio-Electronics there appeared the following editorial by Art 
Kleiman;
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The home computer, however, is directed toward the masses. Here 
the industry is looking for mass volume sales and is touting the 
home computer as a home appliance able to solve a host of problems 
for the homeowner. Who is the industry trying to fool? Does the 
industry really expect John Q. Public to take the computer home, 
learn to program it, interface it and use it to solve problems? 
The same John Q. Public that calls a service technician only to 
discover that the line cord isn't plugged into the wall outlet? 
And what sort of problems does the industry expect the home 
computer to solve? Can anyone name a single application that is 
more meaningful to the home-owner than a $1000 solar energy 
converter? The silence is deafening. To put the home computer in 
perspective, it's a solution looking for a problem. (Kleiman, p.14)
As a result of this investor concern, the semiconductor 
industry suffered a wound which, remaining unhealed, would later 
make it unable to challenge the Japanese. Specifically, this 
damage was the overall decline in technological research and 
equipment investment in an industry where success is dependent on 
high amounts of each. When examining statistics on U.S. investment 
in their plants and plant improvement this trend is starkly 
apparent.
Table 4. Integrated Circuits: U.S. investment in plants and plant 
improvements (excluding production equipment) in thousands of 
— ________________________ dollars___________________ _ __________ _ _
1121 19? 5 i£76 H22 1121
U.S. investment 135,217 102,562 123,916 127,189 172,783
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, Competitive Factors 
Influfflglng Korld TxM slJ jlIC , p *io4
Concerning investment in IC production there was no regression but 
rather a slowdown of funds.
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Table 5. U.S. Investment in the Production of Integrated Circuits
____________________LShmsai&s, of dollars.)------------------
U.S. investment
1974
276,135
1125
296,938
1225
353,067
1177
383,036
1221
505,419
source: U.S. International Trade Commission, Competitive Factors 
inllmm t m  MarM -Tred^ in is, p. 105
In fact, the minimum investment required to produce semiconductor 
wafers rose from two million dollars in 1972, to five million 
dollars by 1976, and up to ten million dollars by 1978 
(Semiconductor Industry-OECD, p.39). Added to this, there existed 
a variable market characterized by intense price competition among 
firms. The result was that a number of companies chose to cut 
their losses by leaving the consumer product market altogether 
(Borrus, p.34).
The year 1978 was of utmost importance to the semiconductor 
industry because it was when the 4K MOS RAM chip was being phased 
out in favor of the more powerful 16K MOS RAM. Even though the 
U.S. industry had suffered a setback due to the recession two years 
previous, it still held a commanding 65 percent total of the 
worlds* MOS production (Gregory, p.196). Yet by the end of the 16K 
RAM's life span in 1982, its market would be under the complete 
control of Japanese producers. To better understand the situation 
that occurred, it is imperative that the Japanese industry between 
1970-78 be examined. The purpose of this will be to look at some 
of the actions taken by the Japanese which enabled them to best use 
to their advantage the shortcomings of the U.S. firms.
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Chapter Four
Japanese Semiconductor Industry 1970-76
For the Japanese firms the period between 1970-76 was 
characterized as a 'catch-up' stage with their competitors in the 
U.S.. This seemed an especially daunting task since Japan began 
this period suffering from a trade imbalance with the United States 
totalling 18,664 million yen (Semiconductor Industry-OECD, p.115). 
In 1970, its total production earned the Japanese firms a total of 
47,410 million yen (Kimura, p.55). This number gains significance 
when compared with the semiconductor production totals of 1975, 
104,746 million yen worth (Ibid, p.55). This nearly three-fold 
increase shows that the Japanese firms were making great strides in 
their production totals. However, almost all of that increase was 
made up of sales within Japan and not from any substantial increase 
in exports to the U.S..
One of the most notable contracts the Japanese firms 
maintained was with Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) 
(Weinstein, Uenohara, and Linvill, p.55). The importance of this 
role was;
In the early 1970's, NTT's need for large quantities of 16K RAMs 
was a major stimulus to the Japanese semiconductor industry, and 
NTT established quality standards that were very high even for 
Japan, where high quality is expected, quarterly reports to NTT's 
suppliers kept them informed on the performance of their products, 
and the suppliers did all they could to meet NTT's rigid 
specifications even when the costs were exorbitant, because they 
knew this would pay off in the long run. (Ibid, p.55)
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It was extremely crucial in giving Japan an edge since it was 
gaining experience in the 16K field while the world-wide standard 
was still 4K. Japan was, in effect, placing a good deal of its 
technological eggs into a very promising, yet not immediately 
profitable, future market. The NTT contract played a role similar 
to that of the space and defense contracts the U.S. government 
provided for its semiconductor companies (Ibid, p.110). The 
contract helped stimulate research within the companies that lead 
to the development of new technologies and capital investment which 
eventually resulted in increased production at lower prices.
It is important to mention that NTT's demand should not be 
overly stressed as being the sole catalyst for Japan's success. It 
was important because it introduced a number of companies to future 
technologies, however its investment alone could not have fueled 
the Japanese semiconductor market. The crucial factors for the 
Japanese during the time before they entered world-wide 16K 
competition was their continued investment in plant production 
during the previously mention 1975 recession and also their 
'superior' labor force.
Japan, like most every other country, also felt the effects of 
the 1974-75 recession. As was previously mentioned, its 
semiconductor industry production totals stumbled, resulting in 
Integrated Circuit production totals that were down six percent 
from 1974 (Semiconductor Industry-OECD, p.114). This decrease was 
not as great as that of the United States' 19 percent (as mentioned
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on page 11) for the very reason that Japan was able to reduce its 
dependency on exports by 21.7 percent (Ibid, p.114). Although this 
was instrumental in weakening the recessions impact, it brings up 
the question of whether or not this adjustment was carried out by 
the government or through some other means.
It seems unlikely that this Softening* was due to any 
government action since there is nothing to show that anything 
concerning Japanese import requirements was changed. In fact, the 
tariff rate remained stable at 12 percent even when raising it was 
a tool easily within the government's reach (Okimoto, Competitive 
Edge, p. 109) . (It should be pointed out that this rate was only 
slightly higher than the U.S.* 10.1 percent but still much lower 
than the European Community's 17 percent) (Ibid, p.109). At the 
same time there was also a measurable shift in the government’s 
focus. Responding to public demand for increased social services, 
funds were diverted from 'unbalanced industrial growth* to an 
"...increased priority for social infrastructure, pollution and 
other environmental control, social welfare (especially retirement 
and health benefits)., and housing." (Patrick, p.14)
Table 6. Growth of Budgeted Government Spending, by Category 
______________(Percent Change from Previous Fiscal Year) ___
1970 197j. 19,72 1973 1114 1115
Social Welfare IS.8 17.7 23.5 32.0 40.9 28.8
Government Pension* 12.4 12.0 9.9 28.3 26.5 26.6
Public Works 17.2 33.6 40.2 7.9 4.1 11.8
Roads 17.9 29.3 31.8 4.3 -0.6 0.1
Housing 20.3 34.7 29.7 22.3 29.6 19.4
Sewers 31.3 92.1 66.9 12.4 22.5 16.2
Foodstuff Control 29.2 4.6 11.1 54.0 22.3 -8.1
Source: Edward Lincoln, Japan Facing Economic Maturity, p.94
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The shift towards reduced American imports seems to have instead 
been a natural business adjustment to what was an inability by the 
U.S. firms to supply their chips to Japanese electronics companies. 
In response to these shortages, Japanese companies thus learned at 
an early stage that if they were to expect a steady supply of chips 
they must learn to be reliant on themselves.
The importance of this 'shift* can not be stressed enough. 
First, it maintained a high level of confidence among Japanese 
industry investors because they were then aware of the fact that 
there was indeed a guaranteed place in the world for the Japanese 
semiconductor industries. Secondly, this confidence led to a 
steadily increasing amount of outside investment being poured into 
the semiconductor industry. This confidence can be best reflected 
by looking at rates concerning the percentage of total funds 
financed by outside sources to the semiconductor companies of the 
U.S. and Japan.
Table 7. Sources of Finance for Japan-Based Semiconductor Firms I 
Internal Funds Equity Issues Bond issues Outside Loans
1970-1972 47.2 2.9 8.8 41.1
(average)
1975-1979 55.2 7.3 10.7 26.8
(average)
1970-1979 51.2 5.1 9.7 34.0
(average)
Source: OECD, Semiconductor Industry-Trade Related Issues, p.121
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Table 8. Sources of Finance for U.S.-Based Semiconductor Firms % 
Internal Funds Equity Issues Bond Issues Qutgidg Loan?
1970-1972 61.8 19.6 9.4 9.2
(average)
1975-1979 79.0 6.6 8.6 5.8
(average)
1970-1979 70.5 13.0 9.0 7.5
(average) 
Source: OECD, Semiconductor Industrv-Trade Related Issues, d
With the U.S. firms forced to rely on more of their own funds, they 
found themselves in a position in which their investment relied on 
how healthy the business environment was during a particular year. 
When business was slow, U.S. companies experienced a smaller amount 
of profits and therefore could invest only a smaller amount of 
money into product development, production equipment, and 
technology research. Research that is ignored in one year will
later come back to haunt a company by hindering them when new 
products are introduced as the industry standard progresses. 
Inability to invest in production equipment and product development 
will not allow a firm to increase its profit margins since it will 
not be able to capitalize on the lower costs that result from fewer 
defects. One reflection of trends within Japanese research 
concerned total semiconductor patent applications. Those in Japan 
increased from 4,406 in 1974 to 6,397 in 1977, while foreign 
applications dropped from ten to seven percent of the total 
(Gregory, p.206).
One example best illustrates the opinion held towards the 
Japanese semiconductor industries in terms of financial stability,
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When a large U.S. semiconductor firm asked a Japanese banker why he 
would lend to the Japanese company that had a high debt to equity 
ratio and would not lend to him, with less than 25 percent debt, 
the reply was, MBecause I know 1*11 get paid by the Japanese firm. 
(Semiconductor Industry, U.S. Dept, of Commerce-ITC, p.24)
The author of this quote then goes on to conclude that the reason 
for this was that, "the Japanese government has taken the risk out 
of investing in target industries in Japan." (Ibid, p.24) This 
argument seems to be flawed because even though the semiconductor 
firms were given special loan considerations by the government, 
there existed no government program that would account for the 
repayment of these loans. Once Japanese semiconductor firms 
received money they had to undertake the policies which they felt 
would best help them succeed in order not only make money, but to 
help pay their debts back.
By having such a favorable borrowing climate the Japanese 
firms were able to strengthen their companies by investing within 
themselves, thus increasing their competitiveness. One portion of 
this investment concerned labor, which in many respects was 
superior to that of the United States. Unlike the U.S. 
semiconductor industry, there was no defection of key employees to 
new firms. The pleasant result of thir was,
...the stability of employment in Japanese companies yields higher 
returns on an investment in training, which gives the company a 
greater incentive to offer expanded training opportunities to its 
employees. (Weinstein, Uenohara, and Linvill, p.6Q)
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Therefore, not only did this help keep costs down since there is no 
need to keep retraining new people, but the experience employees 
acquired allowed them to work at a much more accurate and faster 
rate.
Another positive feature of the Japanese semiconductor labor 
force was that it was a well-trained, hard-working, and efficient 
group. However the determining factor behind creating successful 
employees is usually found within the capability of their managers. 
In management the U.S. and Japanese firms take different approaches 
about which one industry analyst commented:
I believe that one reason Japanese plants are often two or three 
times more productive than similar American and West German plants 
is the hands-on experience of Japanese managers. American and 
German managers spend most of their time in their offices preparing 
instruction manuals and issuing orders. They move in different 
circles from the rank and file, even eating in separate dining 
rooms and using separate washrooms. Japanese plant managers, by 
contrast, begin work earlier than their employees. They don 
overalls and proceed to the factory floor, where they pick up 
knowledge useful in improving productivity. (Makino, p.12)
Unfortunately it is next to impossible to determine the extent 
of the impact created by a ‘superior* Japanese work force, the only 
factor that can be considered is that of the previously discussed 
long-term employment factor. Long-term employment was important to 
Japanese firms because it kept an unbroken stream of expertise 
within the company and also since it gave them the luxury of not 
having to expend money in order to train replacement employees.
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Chapter Five
Semiconductor Industry (1976-1980)
In 1976 semiconductor technology took a step forward when the 
16K MOS RAM chip was introduced to the world electronics market 
(Borrus, p.34). Two years later the 16K RAM would become an 
economically significant factor when it reached the point where it 
equalled that of the previously market-standard 4K RAM chip 
(Warshofsky, p.158). When this occurred, the 4K RAM suddenly 
became less desirable to electronics producers since it was not 
only a weaker chip, but its use was no longer economically 
advantageous. 1976 was important because it can be pointed to as 
the beginning of serious Japanese involvement in the United States 
semiconductor market. By serious, this refers to the fact that not 
only were these companies exporting their products but were doing 
so with a realistic ability to gain part of the U.S. market share. 
In order to best examine the factors which provided for Japan's 
entrance, it is important to keep in mind that the U.S. firms were 
still recovering from a recession that did more damage to them than 
it did to Japanese companies.
Whereas 1975 was characterized by marked reductions in 
production as a reaction to decreased demand, the period from 1976- 
1978 was a completely reversed situation. Not only had many of the 
problems which led to the 1974-75 recession been solved but there 
was renewed growth in the established IC consumer market, namely
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calculators and watches and also the growth of a fledgling computer 
industry (Borrus, p.33). Some of the notable computer-oriented 
companies created during this period include Apple, Tandy 
Computers, Microsoft, and Digital Microsystems (Scannell, p.lll). 
In addition to these new companies, the always steadfast IBM 
reestablished itself as the leader of the computer industry when 
its 4300 computer was favorably received (Warshofsky, p.148). Non­
business computer uses for semiconductors also began to appear 
after 1976. In 1977 Oldsmobile became the first automaker to use 
microchips in the engine control system of one of its cars (Alster, 
p.102)• Other areas in which microchip demand grew were CBs and 
video-games where total production skyrocketed within only a few 
years (Competitive Factors Influencing World Trade in IC, USITC, 
p.102).
From all appearances, this upswing in the economy should have 
been a welcome blessing for the U.S. semiconductor industry. In 
many ways it was, both orders and production increased, pulling the 
industry out of its recessionary lull. Unfortunately though, the 
heightened demand proved to be much too great for the U.S. 
companies to satisfy alone. As a result, the Japanese 
semiconductor firms basically had an open invitation into the U.S. 
market. It was their ability to fully capitalize on this situation 
that was one of the significant events which contributed to Japans 
eventual dominance of the US dRAM market . The extent of the U . S . 
firms' inability to satisfy 16K MOS RAM demand was apparent on a 
number of occasions. During 1979 IBM began shopping in Japan for
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16K DRAM chips mainly because there was a shortage of these items 
being sold by U.S. companies (Hataye-IBM, p.18). This action was 
symbolically important since IBM, the figurehead of American 
electronics, was forced to go to Japan for the devices it needed in 
its products. It was, in effect, saying American companies were 
simply incapable of sustaininn its own technological growth. In 
order to get semiconductors, customers in the U.S. actually had to 
place orders six months in advance, and even then they were not 
guaranteed on-time delivery (Surge in Semicon, pp.1,107). One of 
these victims was Mattel Electronics, who was unable to release its 
Intellivision video game system during the profitable Christmas 
shopping season solely because of the shortage in semiconductors 
(Mattel: CPU, p.22).
It should again be mentioned that U.S. firms also benefitted 
from increased demand, but that they were unable to capitalize on 
this demand in the manner that the Japanese companies did. This 
‘maximization* was in areas in which both research in next- 
generation technologies and product improvement benefitted. To 
better understand this it is necessary to look at the methods by 
which investment was undertaken and the effect it had on 
production.
Perhaps the most salient characteristic which influences 
investment is the economic environment in which semiconductor 
companies produce their product. When looking at information from 
the 16K era a strong argument can be made that the Japanese 
semiconductor companies operated in a system which was more
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conducive to allowing firms to grow. This economic environment 
will be examined as it is related to the larger financial world.
Unlike Japan, the United States firms, aside from IBM and 
AT&T, were comprised of a large number of individual companies who 
were not very diversified in terms of production. These companies 
were for the most part concerned mainly with creating microchips, 
while those in Japan could be characterized as ,M...highly 
diversified, vertically integrated electronic equipment 
manufacturers (that produced) a wide variety of home appliances, 
data processing, telecommunications, automotive electronics and 
medical equipment** (Gregory, p.96). Flaherty and Itami compiled a 
list in which both U.S. and Japanese firms were grouped into 
categories describing their business characteristics.
1. Heavily diversified and somewhat vertically integrated 
electronics firms prominent in the state-of-the-art, 
high-volume memory market: Fujitsu, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, 
NEC, Oki, and Toshiba.
2. Heavily diversified and somewhat vertically integrated 
electronics firms not prominent in the state-of-the-art, 
high-volume memory market; Matsushita, Sharp, Sony, Tokyo 
Sanyo.
3. Moderately diversified and not vertically integrated 
electronics firms: Motorola, Texas Instruments.
4. Specialized integrated circuit firms: AMD, Intel,
National Semiconductor.
5. Conglomerates (heavily diversified and not vertically 
integrated) selling integrated circuits: Philips 
(Signetics), Schlumberger (Fairchild), United 
Technologies (Mostek)•
6. Diversified and vertically integrated producers of 
semiconductors: AT&T, IBM. (Flaherty and Itami, p.161)
The importance of this was the stability it created within the 
company. Any economic downturn in a company's semiconductor
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department could be offset by revenues generated from profits in 
other sections of the company. This is important because it 
greatly decreases the chance of the company going under, allows for 
an unbroken stream of finance into long-term research projects, and 
also provides for a high degree of confidence on the part of 
outside investors. As far as production totals are concerned, when 
comparing the main Japanese and U.S. semiconductor producers, 
semiconductor divisions comprised an average of seven percent of 
total sales in Japan and 71 percent in the U.S. (Semiconductor 
Industry-OECD, p.46).
One item previously mentioned concerned the portion of 
financing that came from the company’s internal funds. As was 
mentioned before, the U.S. relied on internal funding to a greater 
extent than Japan. The reason for this difference can be traced 
directly to the borrowing conditions which existed within each 
country. In the U.S., the discount rate increased from 6.0 percent 
in December of 1977 to 12.0 percent by the end of 1979 (Lincoln, 
p.259) , The effect of this was that it, “...dried up what was once 
a major source of capital for computer firms.” (Verity, p.29,Sect 
II) In Japan the comparable rate was 4.2 percent by the end of 
1977 and 6.2 percent at the end of 1979 (Lincoln, p.259). An 
additional difficulty for small U.S. companies was that they were 
forced to accept short-term loans with five to seven percent 
additional rates tacked on (Verity, p.29, Sect II). As a result, 
the average Japanese producer was able to operate with a 9.3 
percent cost of capital while the American companies were at 17.5
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percent (Cook, p.103). After examining these numbers, there does 
not seem to be any question as to why Japanese investment grew. It 
simply had access to money at much better rates and therefore the 
decision to invest was easier for them to make, simply because they 
had less to pay back.
Table 9. Semlcondyctor,Capital Spending (Millions of PQ.na.rs]____
Japanese Firms U.S. Firms
Capital, spending I..q L Sales capital spending I of Sales
1976 $238.6 21.3% $306.0 9.0%
1977 179.4 14.1 413.4 10.6
1978 453.2 18.2 650.1 13.6
1979 656.3 22.4 887.1 13.4
1980 956.2 24.9 1,299.8 15.4
1981 1,046.7 25.1 1,424.0 17.8
1982 1,301.0 27.8 1,188.4 14.8
Source: Howell, Noellert, et. all, The Microelectronics Race, p.218
No matter how much money a company receives, success is not 
entirely guaranteed. Instead, the important item used in 
determining is that the proper things be invested into. For the 
Japanese semiconductor companies, the improvements they authorized 
within their own firms were what ultimately produced (letter 
products. Unlike the U.S. firms, the Japanese companies chose to 
follow a conservative approach when producing their chips, By
conservative this refers to,
Japanese engineers described three design features to illustrate 
how they had 'designed quality into the chip.* First, they were 
more liberal than their U.S. counterparts in the use of border 
areas; this was expensive, but by leaving more space, they were 
able to avoid certain bonding problems. Second, they claimed to 
have made an important breakthrough in the packaging process.
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Heretofore, the two choices in packaging had been hermetic, which 
is very reliable but expensive, and plastic. The Japanese 
developed a new plasma nitride passivation technology that made 
plastic more reliable. (According to the Japanese, American 
experiments along the same line produced products that were too 
thin and often defective, not comparable in quality to the Japanese 
packaging.) Third, the conservative design of Japanese chips was 
said to have made it easier to deal with the problem of alpha 
particle immunity, which was a cause of soft errors. (Those which 
do not actually change the physical make-up of the semiconductor 
and therefore are much more difficult to detect since they give no 
outward symptoms of being incorrect.) The Japanese developed a 
technology to overcome the alpha particle problem by overcoating 
the chip. (Weinstein, Uenohara, and Linvill, p.52)
The Japanese strongly believe that the only acceptable defect 
ration is none, while U.S. companies agree that at least some are 
to be expected and therefore permitted.
Life tests, environmental tests, function tests and failure origin 
tests are carried out in great number, over and over again, at all 
stages from design to development through production. Using this 
so-called failures in time standard (FITS), Japanese semiconductor 
manufacturers consider 15 to 30 failures per billion hours of 
operation to be high quality, while 100 failures are rated good. 
(By comparison, the U.S. space industry sets 2 failures per billion 
hours of operation as standard). (Gregory, p.200).
What this type of production resulted in was a markedly higher 
quality on the part of Japanese producers. One survey conducted 
concerning the quality and reliability of Japanese and U.S. RAH 
circuits found that the average rejection ratio for 16K RAMs made 
in Japan was 0.87 percent, while that for U.S. firms was twice as 
high at 1.70 percent (Semiconductor Industry-Paris, p.124). Once 
these defected chips had been weeded out the next concern was their 
reliablity at performing their specified jobs. For Japanese RAH
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circuits, the reliability levels measured (in percent of failures 
per thousand hours) was strikingly low at 0.027 percent (Ibid, 
p. 12 4) . The comparable rate among U.S. products was almost five 
times higher, at 0.125 percent (Ibid, p.124). From this statistic 
we can truthfully claim that the Japanese chip was actually better 
than the American one.
The inferiority of American products as being the crucial 
factor in choosing a producer by a large company was first brought 
up by Hewlett-Packard chairman David Packard, whose company 
discovered that Japanese rejection levels for chips was around 0.1 
percent while those from American firms are around 0.6 percent 
(Halper, p.83). He stated that,
When it comes to the fact that we can't get products from (U.S. 
suppliers) that perform anywhere near as well, we have no choice 
but to go to the Japanese. (Ibid, p.83)
This opinion was also voiced by other industry leaders, Doug Malone 
of GTE stated,
I do concur with Packard. I'm very concerned. The quality (of 
Japanese parts) is indeed very good. It's getting better. The 
quality from the domestic suppliers is eroding somewhat. 
Domestically, we've lost the formula. They're doing what we did 20 
years ago and doing it very well. (Ibid, p.83).
As for prices, the semiconductor industry is subject to what 
is known as a 'learning curve'. The learning curve is an economic 
phenomenon in which prices decrease (usually by 25-35 percent) as 
total production doubles (Kimura, p.49). During the lifespan of
*
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the 16K RAM, this adjustment swung into full effect j.n 1980, when 
prices during just one quarter fell from $4.00 to $2.50 (Weinstein, 
Uenohara, et al., p.72). This combination of declining quantities 
of devices being produced and higher Japanese product quality made 
it very difficult for U.S. semiconductor consumers to continue 
refusing to use Japanese devices. As a result of this and higher 
product quality, Japan was able to control 43 percent of the U.S. 
16K RAM market by the beginning of 1980 (Borrus, p.106).
In terms of new-technologies research, Japan once again showed 
no signs of letting up. However during this time there were also 
signs of reinvigoration in the U.S. as its research totals began to 
increase.
Table 10. Semiconductor Research and Development Spending_______
Japanese Firms U.S. Firms
Capitals&aijdiog LjaL-Sfllss cap ital .spending % of sales
1976 $164.7 14.7% $227.8 6.7%
1977 199.8 15.7 300.3 7.7
1978 375.9 15.1 384.3 8.0
1979 427.8 14.6 470.0 7.1
1980 483.8 12.6 624.6 7.4
1981 621.3 14.9 776.0 9.7
1982 725.4 15.5 875.3 10.9
Source: Howell, Noellert, et. all, The Microelectronics Race, p.219
Between 1976*80 research continued in a number of areas within 
different companies, but the one that received the greatest 
publicity was Japan*s Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) program. 
This program was organized in 1976 by the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Investment in order to link together 
private Japanese semiconductor firms for the purpose of creating 
new generation 64K chips (Cook, p.101) . The fact that this program 
did exist and that it did do a number of positive things for the 
Japanese semiconductor industry is often viewed by many in the U.S. 
as being 'government intervention'. Something that was considered 
nothing less than unfair assistance. Upon closer examination it 
can be shown that the most useful result of this program was that 
it improved on a number of processes that had previously been 
invented in the U.S., such as electronic beam lithography, plasma 
etching (Weinstein, Uenohara, et al., p.51).
In fact, of all the new technologies created as a result of 
this program, only 'evaluation technology for oxide and nitride 
layers by liquid crystal' was considered to be an industry 
breakthrough (Ibid, p.39). The project as a whole can be described 
as a number of competing companies who without government guidance 
simply would never have come together since they each distrusted 
the other (Naohiro, p.42). once they were working together, this 
distrust still persisted. The firms were unwilling to send their 
most valuable employees to the project simply because they did want 
the other companies to gain their valuable research knowledge. As 
a result of this the only research which took place was basically 
that which was generally known. The companies invested their time 
into looking at existing technologies and finding out ways in which 
they could be improved.
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion
By the time the Japanese firms were getting ready to compete 
in the 64K RAM market they were already a strong actor. Their 
involvement in this particular microchip continued the policies 
they had previously followed, being continued investment into both 
their own production systems and research. The result of this was 
that they were constantly improving in an industry where this type 
of behavior is eventually rewarded. The purpose of this paper was 
to try and better understand the reasons behind Japan's success in 
the United States semiconductor market. As was mentioned at the 
beginning and seen throughout this paper, Japan's entrance was the 
result of actions in the United States as much as those in Japan.
Japan succeeded in making a quality product in a manner that 
many analysts do not usually consider. There existed no dynamic 
new innovations or huge government subsidies that served to propel 
the Japanese toward eventual semiconductor domination. Instead, 
the real reason seems to have been much less exotic. The Japanese 
succeeded because they created a superior product by doing a better 
job than their opponents in investing within their firms. During 
the recession years, the Japanese companies still managed to keep 
funding flowing into areas in which they saw future promise. They 
also were able to keep this investment within their own firms 
through an employment system which encouraged continued service
with the same company. Whether or not the Japanese companies would 
have been able to compete in the American market had the U.S. firms 
teen doing the same type of quality job is questionable. 
Nevertheless there is no denying the fact that the U.S.' s inability 
to capitalize on its own market demands was a window of opportunity 
which the Japanese used fully.
The most serious problem the U.S. firms faced was that they 
were very much isolated from one another and were forced to compete 
on their own. This was especially reflected in the high percentage 
of internal funding they had to rely on. Although the U.S. 
government had labeled this a strategically crucial area in which 
succor- was imperative it did not do anything to make the consumer 
market easier for these firms to become involved in. This was 
especially apparent in the extraordinarily hi^h borrowing rates 
these firms were subject to. For the U.S. firms, the recessionary 
year 1975 was another contributing factor to its decline. Since 
the U.S. firms were so heavily reliant on their own financial 
fortunes, this economic downturn resulted in what appears to have 
been a break in their investment programs. The result of this was 
that it left them unable to fully capitalize on the unexpected boom 
in demand that would occur soon afterward. The importance of this 
examination is that it serves to better explain the reasons behind 
decline in at least one of the United States1 industries. Much too 
often the blame is unfairly shifted from a domestic source to one 
located overseas, namely Japan. In this case the attributes that 
led to the United States' problems could very easily have been
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averted if it had only been able to receive a small amount of 
assistance from the government. Rather than large defense 
contracts this industry would probably have done better in the 
commercial sector if it had received assistance in such areas as 
investor guarantees and discounted rates on semiconductor 
investment. Hopefully the actions taken in future semiconductor 
technologies will be undertaken by those in the U.S. who are aware 
of their industry*s history and the lessons it teaches.
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